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1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Principal Issues. The gravest environmental challenge
facing humanity today is global climate change.1 Its costs are potentially huge and
its e¤ect worldwide.2 Furthermore, there is time-pressure on the worlds governments
to deal with the problem now.
***This paper has benetted from the comments of seminar audiences at the University of
Michigan, University of Rochester, Boston University, CalTech, UCLA, Columbia University, The
Stockholm School of Economics and New York University. Of course, all errors are our very own.
1Here are three facts about global climate change:
1. In the last 140 years, global surface temperatures have risen 0.6 degrees C
2. All ten of the warmest recorded years have been since 1990, including each of the last seven
years.
3. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that - without signicant
changes - temperatures will rise between 1.5 and 5.5 degrees C by 2100.
(see the BBC Science report, December 6, 2004, in http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4061871.stm.)
2The importance of global warming is underlined in the discussions at the two worldwide summits
- Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and Kyoto in 1997 - as well as in the follow-up sessions at the Hague in
2000 and in Bonn and Marrakesh in 2001 and Buenos Aires in 2004.
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This paper studies a simple strategic model of global climate change and asks:
what are the economic consequences of unregulated climate change? Is there a
simple set of self-enforcing guidelines that improve on the current situation? And
by how much? What is the best regulationor treaty that governments can sign?
What is the e¤ect of the many cost di¤erences across countries? Most of the analysis
is theoretical but we also report results from a numerical calibration of the model.
Various factors contribute to global warming, but the major one is increase in
greenhouse gases (GHGs) - primarily, carbon dioxide - so called because they are
transparent to incoming shortwave solar radiation but trap outgoing longwave in-
frared radiation. Increased carbon emissions due to the burning of fossil fuel, in order
to generate energy, is commonly cited as the principal immediate cause of global
warming.3 One important fact to keep in mind here is that carbon dioxide buildup
is very slow to reverse itself.4
Although there is considerable uncertainty about the exact costs of global warm-
ing, the two principal sources will be a rise in the sea-level and climate changes. The
former may wash away low-lying coastal areas such as Bangladesh and the Nether-
lands. Climate changes are more di¢ cult to predict; tropical countries will become
more arid and less productive agriculturally; there will be an increased likelihood of
hurricanes, res and forest loss; and there will be the unpredictable consequences of
damage to the natural habitat of many living organisms. Note that these costs are
quite unevenly distributed; the Southwill su¤er more than the Northand even
within a single country there will be disparities.
On the other hand, emission abatement imposes its own costs. Higher emissions
are typically associated with greater GDP and consumer amenities (via increased
energy usage). Reducing emissions will require many or all of the following costly
activities: cutbacks in energy production, switches to alternative modes of produc-
tion, investment in more energy e¢ cient equipment, investment in R&D to generate
alternative sources of energy, etc.
The principal features of the global climate change problem are:
 The Global Common - although the source of carbon buildup is localized, it
is the total stock of GHGs in the global environment that will determine the
amount of warming.
3The IPCC 2001 report declared unequivocally most of the observed warming over the last fty
years is likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations. Cumulative
carbon emissions on account of fossil-fuel use rose from 0.1 gigatons to 5.5 gigatons between 1880
and 1980. In the same period, emissions from forest depletion rose from 0.75 to 2.5 gigatons. (For
these and related gures, see Grubler and Fujii, 1991).
4In the article In Kyoto the Subject is Climate, the Forecast is Storms, The New York Times,
November 27, 1997, one climatologist described current worldwide e¤orts to contain global warming
as trying to turn an oil tanker in a sea of jello.
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 Irreversibility - since the stock of greenhouse gases depletes slowly, the e¤ect of
current emissions can be felt into the distant future.
 Asymmetry - some regions will su¤er more than others.
 Nonlinearity - the costs can be very nonlinear; a rise in one degree may have
little e¤ect but a rise in several degrees may be catastrophic.
The theoretical framework that accommodates all of these features is an asym-
metric dynamic commons model with the global stock of greenhouse gases as the
(common) state variable. We study such a model with all the above characteristics
except non-linearity and, additionally, two other features:
 A StrategicModel - Although the players (countries) are relatively numerous,
there are some very large players, and blocks of like-minded countries, like
the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan. That warrants a strategic analysis.
Furthermore a lesson of history is that the only good international treaties are
those that are incentive-compatible for the signatories. (Indeed an objection
to the Kyoto Protocol - although not the one commonly cited - is that it is not
incentive-compatible; more on this in Section 8.)5
 A Simple Model - The model we study embeds a very simple linear description
of how global climate change a¤ects the physical and economic world. This
is done for two reasons: one, for a theoretical exercise to have any chance of
informing policy-makers in even one country, leave alone 200, its conclusions
have to be simple. (Indeed all the proposals at Kyoto or follow-up conferences
have involved simple across the board cuts in emissions.) Second, that also
allows us to calibrate our model and derive some numerical guideposts.
The research reported in this paper is a rst step of an ongoing program (see also
the further discussion in Section 8 and especially, Dutta and Radner (2004a-d) as
well as Dutta, Park and Radner (2004, in preparation).
1.2. The Results. In the model, each country adds to a global stock of green-
house gases (GHGs) by its emission of those gases. The existing stock depreciates
at a constant rate over time. Emissions arise from the production and consumption
of energy, and other productive activities, and hence higher emissions are associated
with, at least up to a point, higher benets. The cost of global climate change is
linear in the amount of GHGs in the earths atmosphere. Both the benets as well as
5All of the existing analyses of global climate change are either non-strategic or static. For
reviews of the literature and further references, see Heal (1997), Finus (2001), and Barrett (2003).
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the costs vary across countries. The model has a small set of parameters that guide
it, and drawing on estimates for those parameters that are available in the literature,
we are also able to calibrate the model.
We start with two baseline results (Section 3). We rst show that Global Pareto
optimal (GPO) emission proles involve a constant emission of GHGs by each country,
i.e., constant across GHG levels, and hence through time.6 Call such a Pareto optimal
emission vector ba.
Next we characterize a Markov Perfect equilibrium (MPE) that is qualitatively
similar to the GPO solution; it too involves a constant emission at rate a by each
country. Not surprisingly, this equilibrium, which we call Business as Usual (BAU),
exhibits the tragedy of the commons; a is strictly higher than the GPO vectorba. The numerical estimates for this over-emission are illustrative. For base-line
parameter values, the GPO is between 8 and 10% lower than the BAU level for
developed economies and between 28 and 34% lower for developing economies and
China. (Contrast this with the Kyoto sanctioned 5% cut for developed economies.)
Corresponding welfare loss - in per period terms - ranges from 0.1% for base-line costs
to 2% for higher cost estimates.
We then turn to the main question(s) of this paper: can countries do better than
globally warm at the BAU rate, i.e., are there equilibria that are Pareto-improvements
over the BAU solution? Put di¤erently, can countries sign a Kyoto-like agreement
that slows down the pace of global warming and is honored by all signatories?
In Section 4 we start with Nash or BAU reversion trigger strategy equilibria - since
these are the simplest to implement. The two main theoretical results here show that
for all discount factors and all countries, one can do strictly better; the highest welfare
level is strictly higher than the BAU one and the minimum incentive-compatible
emission levels are strictly lower than the BAU levels. Second, if discount factors
are high enough, then, in fact, the GPO emission levels are themselves sustainable.
We then provide empirical evidence for these results. For the base-line parameter
values, the minimum sustainable emissions are already lower than the GPO levels for
all regions except Eastern Europe (and some FSU allies such as North Korea). In
particular, the greatest discrepancies arise for Russia and Ukraine where the GPO
emission levels are, respectively, 39% and 40% lower than the BAU emission levels but
the maximum sustainable cuts from BAU levels are only 20% and 19% respectively.
The e¤ect of asymmetry is studied in Section 5 by analyzing trigger strategy
equilibria. Since there is no obvious measure of asymmetry with many countries,
we restrict attention to two countries - or regions - and measure asymmetry by the
6The GPO emission is constant on account of the linearity in the cost function; that, coupled
with the constant depreciation rate, implies that the marginal valuation of a unit of emission is
independent of the existing stock of GHG.
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di¤erence in (marginal) costs of GHG. Starting with the no-asymmetry case where the
GPO itself is sustainable we show that increasing asymmetry leads to strict welfare
loss, i.e., leads to a reduction in the total payo¤s of the two countries. Again we
provide numerical analogs of these results by focussing on China and the United
States.
The last two sections are purely theoretical. In Section 6 we characterize the
full set of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that the best equilibria have
a remarkably simple structure - they too have a constant emission vector along the
equilibrium path, say a (and this rate is strictly lower than the BAU rate a). The
sanctions that support such a low emission level is the worst equilibrium for each
player. That equilibrium is asymmetric (even in a symmetric game) and has an
interesting two-stage structure. In the rst stage, and for exactly one period, all
countries other than the deviant country emit a very high amount, in excess of
the BAU level. This behavior punishes all countries. For the sanctioning countries,
the compensation is that in the second stage play proceeds to an equilibrium they
prefer (and one that the sanctioned country does not). This is the equilibrium that
maximizes a weighted sum of (equilibrium) payo¤s, with zero weight on the sanctioned
country. In such an equilibrium, the country with zero weight typically has to settle
for very low emissions. This then is the long-term cost that a country su¤ers by
breaking an agreement; its emission quotais permanently reduced.
Finally in Section 7 we consider emission strategies that are Markovian but not
necessarily constant and we demonstrate the existence of MPE that have simultane-
ously basins of tragic attraction- levels of GHGs that are inoptimally high which
once the system gets into there are no incentives to get out of - as well as basins of
low GHG buildup- regions of carbon buildup that are no more than what a global
planner would recommend. In other words, we show that there are MPE that have
simultaneously characteristics of badand goodequilibria; where the system ends
up depends then on where it started.
Section 8 concludes with some suggestions for extending the model to make it
more realistic, including the incorporation of technological change, economic and
population growth, and a literature review. Proofs are gathered in the Appendix -
Section 9.
2. A Simple Model
In this section we present a simplied model to illustrate the basic strategic ideas. In
this model there is no population growth and no possibility of changing the emissions
producing technologies in each country.7 However, the countries may di¤er in their
sizes,their emissions technologies, and their preferences.
7Population growth is studied in Dutta and Radner (2004b) while certain kinds of technological
changes are allowed in Dutta and Radner (2004a).
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There are I countries. The emission of (a scalar index of) greenhouse gases during
period t by country i is denoted by ai(t). [Time is discrete, with t = 0; 1; 2; :::; ad
inf.] Let A(t) denote the global (total) emission during period t;
A(t) =
IX
i=1
ai(t): (1)
The total (global) stock of greenhouse gases (GHGs) at the beginning of period t
is denoted by g(t). The law of motion for the total GHG is
g(t+ 1) = A(t) + g(t); (2)
where  is a given parameter (0 <  < 1). We may interpret (1 ) as the fraction of
the beginning-of-period stock of GHG that is dissipated from the atmosphere during
the period. The surviving stock, g(t); is augmented by the quantity of global
emissions, A(t), during the same period.
Suppose that the utility of country i in period t is
vi(t) = hi[ai(t)]  cig(t): (3)
The function hi represents, for example, what country is gross national product
would be at di¤erent levels of its own emissions, holding the global level of GHG
constant. This function reects the costs and benets of producing and using energy
as well as the costs and benets of other activities that have an impact on the emis-
sions of GHGs, e.g., the extent of forestation. For a given population there will be an
optimal level of energy use, forestation, etc., and hence an optimal level of emissions.
It therefore seems natural to assume that hi is a strictly concave C2 function that
reaches a maximum and then decreases thereafter.8
The parameter ci > 0 represents the marginal cost to the country of increasing
the global stock of GHG. Of course, it is not the stock of GHG itself that is costly,
but the associated climatic conditions. In a more general model, the cost would be
nonlinear. The total payo¤ (utility) for country i is
vi =
1X
t=0
tvi(t): (4)
For the sake of simplicity, we have taken the discount factor, ; to be the same for
all countries. At time t, a history of play is an enumeration of past GHG levels up to
8However, none of the results depend on h having a nite argmax.
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and including the current one as well as past emissions for all countries.9 A strategy
for country i at time t, call it it, is a measurable map from the set of histories to
the set of emissions. A strategy for the whole game, denoted by i, is a sequence of
such strategies: i  [ i0; i1, :::: it, :::].10 Let  denote a prole of strategies, one
for each country:  = (1, 2, ... I). A particularly simple strategy for country i is
to condition her action at period t only on the state at that period; such a strategy
is called a Markovian strategy.
Each prole ; and the initial level of GHG, g0, determine in an obvious manner
country i0s payo¤ in period t; denote this payo¤ by vi(t;; g0). Thus associated with
each prole is a total discounted payo¤ for each player
vi(; g0) 
1X
t=0
tvi(t;; g0):
As usual, a prole of strategies  forms a Nash Equilibrium (or just an equilib-
rium) from the initial GHG level g0 if no player can increase her total discounted
expected payo¤ by unilaterally changing her strategy. A prole  forms a subgame
perfect Equilibrium (SPE) if after every history the continuation strategies of  form
a Nash equilibrium. If a prole of Markovian strategies forms a Nash equilibrium
from every initial state then it is called a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE); note
that an MPE is also an SPE.
2.1. An Illustrative Example. The theoretical results of this paper will be il-
lustrated throughout by use of a calibrated model using parameter values that have
been considered in the literature. The aim is to provide thereby some numerical
orders of magnitude for the results stated here. In this subsection we will briey de-
scribe the numerical analysis and in subsequent sections we will present the numerical
analogs immediately following the appropriate theoretical results.
The numerical example is taken from a much more extensive analysis by Sangwon
Park (Park 2004). In his model, 184 countries are grouped for calibration purposes
into eight regions: the United States, Western Europe, Other High Income, Eastern
Europe, Middle Income, Lower Middle Income, China, and Lower Income. [This
grouping enables Park to utilize the data and estimates provided by Nordhaus and
Boyer (2000).] The base year is 1998 (t = 0). Referring to Eq. 3, the utility
9If there is imperfect monitoring, then player i0s history will only contain her own past actions.
In this paper we shall restrict attention to the perfect monitoring case, although our results on
Markovian strategies will apply to the case of imperfect monitoring, as well. This is because, by
denition, Markovian strategies only condition on the observable part of history, i.e., the total stock
of GHGs.
10For expositional ease we restrict attention to pure strategies. None of the results would change
by allowing mixed strategies.
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of country i net of warming costs, its gross national product after subtracting the
amount of capital needed to maintain the capital stock at its 1998 level, hi, is given
by:
hi[ai(t)] = iK
i
i L
1 i i
i
ai(t)
fi
i
  piai(t)
fi
where Ki and Li are the capital and labor inputs, respectively; fi is the emission
factor of country i and pi is the price of energy. To explain the last two terms
in greater detail, imagine that energy is a proxy for a scalar index of emissions-
producing inputs, measured in coalequivalent metric tons. Then for every unit of
energy there are associated fi units of emissions. Countries di¤er in their emission
factors - countries with cleaner technologies have lower fi than those with dirtier
technologies. The Greek letters are parameters. These parameters as well as the
price of energy, pi, is the same for all countries in the same region (that is what
denes a region) while the damage coe¢ cient ci is based on a combination of country
and group-specic data and is drawn from Fankhauser (1995). All three production
inputs - capital, labor, and energy - are country-specic.
All countries have the same discount factor, , which for sensitivity analysis has
been varied between 0:97 and 0:995. These would seem to bracket the values com-
monly discussed in the literature, motivated by di¤erent interpretations of  as reect-
ing "social values" or the returns on investment. In what follows utility is measured
in 1990 U.S. dollars and emissions are measured in gigatons of carbon.
3. Two Benchmarks
In this section we characterize two benchmarks - the global Pareto optimuma, and a
simple Markov Perfect Equilibrium, called Business As Usual.
3.1. Global Pareto Optima. Let x = (xi) be a vector of positive numbers, one
for each country. A Global Pareto Optimum (GPO) corresponding to x is a prole of
strategies that maximizes the weighted sum of country payo¤s,
v =
X
i
xivi; (5)
which we shall call global welfare. Without loss of generality, we may take the weights,
xi, to sum to 1.
Theorem 1. Let V^ (g) be the maximum attainable global welfare starting with an
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initial GHG stock equal to g; then
V^ (g) = bu  wg; (6)
w =
1
1  
X
i
xici;
bu = Pi xihi(a^i)  wA^
1   ;
A^ =
X
i
a^i;
where a^i is determined by
xih
0
i(a^i) = w: (7)
(It is assumed that this last equation has a solution.) Furthermore, country is GPO
strategy is to use a constant emission equal to a^i in all periods and after all histories.
Theorem 1 states that, independently of the level of GHG, g, each country should
emit an amount a^i. The fact that the optimal emission is constant follows from the
linearity of the model in g. Notice that on account of the linearity in the gas buildup
equation - Eq. 2 - a unit of emission in period t can be analyzed in isolation as a
surviving unit of size  in period t+ 1, 2 in period t+ 2, 3 in period t+ 2, and so
on. On account of the linearity in cost, these surviving units add (
P
i xici)   in
period t + 1, (
P
i xici)  ()2 in period t + 2, and so on, i.e., the marginal lifetime
cost is 1
1 
P
i xici or w. And that marginal cost is independent of g.
3.2. A Markov-Perfect Equilibrium: Business as Usual. This MPE
shares the feature that the equilibrium emission rate of each country is constant in
time, and it is the unique MPE with this property. We shall call it the Business-as-
Usualequilibrium.
Theorem 2. (Business-as-Usual Equilibrium). Let g be the initial stock of GHG.
For each country i, let ai* be determined by
h0i(ai*) = wi; (8)
wi =
ci
1   ;
and let its strategy be to use a constant emission equal to ai* in each period; then
this strategy prole is a MPE, and country is corresponding payo¤ is
Vi*(g) = ui   wig; (9)
ui =
hi(ai*)  wiA*
1   ;
A* =
X
j
aj*.
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The intuition for the existence of an MPE with constant emissions is similar to
that for the GPO solution. As long as other countries do not make their emissions
contingent on the level of GHGs, country i has a constant marginal lifetime cost to
emissions. There are, however, other MPEs in which countries do condition on g, and
some of them will be described in Section 7.
3.3. Comparison of the GPO and Business as Usual. The preceding results
enable us to compare the emissions in the GPO with those in the Business-as-Usual
MPE:
GPO : h0i(a^i) =

P
j xjcj
xi(1  ) ; (10)
BAU : h0i(ai*) =
ci
1   :
Since
xici <
X
j
xjcj;
it follows that
ci
1   <

P
j xjcj
xi(1  ) :
Since hi is concave, it follows that
ai* > a^i: (11)
Note that this inequality holds except in the trivial case in which all welfare
weights are zero (except one). In other words, there is a tragedy of the commons
whenever there is some externality to emissions. In turn, all this follows from Eq. 8,
which says that in the BAU equilibrium each country only considers its own marginal
cost and ignores the cost imposed on other countries on account of its emissions; in
the GPO solution that additional cost is, of course, accounted for. It follows that
the GPO is strictly Pareto superior to the MPE for an open set of welfare weights xi
(and leads to a strictly lower steady-state GHG level for all welfare weights).
3.4. Numerical Results on the GPO and BAU. In this subsection we present
numerical results on the emission levels and welfare values - especially in a compar-
ative sense - of the GPO and BAU solutions. As indicated above, the results are
derived by using numerical estimates for parameter values that have been used else-
where by Fankhauser (1995) and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). We start with the
benchmark case in which  = 0:97 and cost coe¢ cients ci are as given in Fankhauser.
This case has been calibrated so that the BAU matches available data and esti-
mates for 1998. The benchmark GPO then uses the same parameter values and
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initial conditions. (Throughout, in computing GPO trajectories, we have taken the
country-welfare weights xi to be equal to 1. The consequences of using other welfare
weights have been explored in Park (2004).)
Table 1 - Benchmark Case ( = 0:97; cost = Fankhauser ci, Year = 1998)
Region=Emissions BAU (Gtc) GPO (Gtc) % Difference (BAU GPO
BAU
)
United States 1:50 1:36 9%
Western Europe 0:86 0:79 8%
Other High Income 0:59 0:53 9%
Eastern Europe 0:74 0:45 39%
Middle Income (MI) 0:41 0:36 12%
Lower MI 0:58 0:41 30%
China 0:85 0:56 34%
Lower Income 0:66 0:48 28%
Total 6:18 4:93 20%
The most striking results are: a) BAU emission levels are most signicantly higher
(relative to GPO) for Eastern Europe, presumably on account of Soviet-era energy
technologies; b) the next signicant departures are for China and Lower Middle In-
come countries (that include India) and this is particularly worrisome if the major
growth spurt of the next fty years comes from those countries, which will then move
them way past Eastern Europe in over-emission levels; and c) that the United States
and Western Europe account for over 40% of current total emissions and hence a
cut-back to GPO levels in those regions alone can signicantly narrow the overall
GPO-BAU gap.
The di¤erences between GPO and BAU are magnied if either of the two ba-
sic parameters are increased. Consider an increase in the discount factor to 0.995
(reecting the idea that environmental discount factors ought to be closer to 1 for
inter-generational equity reasons); this is Table 2. The main ndings while qual-
itatively similar - Eastern Europe is the greatest problem - show that China and
Lower Income Countries have almost as much over-emissions. This could pose a
huge problem down the line if these economies continue to grow strongly.11
11A change in the second parameter, raising the cost estimates to 5x Fankhauser - reecting
possible catastrophic costs - increases the range of over-emissions to 56% (Western Europe) to 90%
(Eastern Europe).
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Table 2 - Sensitivity Analysis I ( = 0:995; cost = Fankahauser ci, Year =
1998)
Region=Emissions BAU (Gtc) GPO (Gtc) % Difference (BAU GPO
BAU
)
United States 1:50 1:15 23%
Western Europe 0:86 0:69 20%
Other High Income 0:59 0:46 22%
Eastern Europe 0:74 0:27 64%
Middle Income (MI) 0:41 0:29 28%
Lower MI 0:58 0:27 54%
China 0:85 0:32 62%
Lower Income 0:66 0:32 52%
Total 6:18 3:76 39%
We now turn to value comparisons, i.e., to the question: how much is the welfare
loss due to over-emission and its consequent increase in global temperatures? Unlike
Tables 1 and 2 which report a one-shot picture, the welfare analysis takes account of
the innite future. In particular, what is computed is the present discounted average
value of GNP less carbon costs - i.e., (1   )Vi - so that when  is close to 1 the
discounted average value is close to the long-term yearly average. Note that if 2% of
a countrys GNP were invested every year, the rate of growth of its economy would
be dramatically increased.
Table 3 provides value loss estimates for  = 0:97 while Table 4 provides the paral-
lel estimates for  = 0:995. The carbon cost parameters are drawn from Fankhauser
(1997) - denoted FC - and the sensitivity analysis is to vary them between his esti-
mates (= FC) and ve times his estimates (= 5XFC):
Table 3 - Value Loss when  = 0:97
V alue Loss=Cost Parameter FC 2XFC 3XFC 4XFC 5XFC
(GPO  BAU)=BAU in 1998 dollars 0:11% 0:4% 0:82% 1:34% 1:95%
Table 4 - Value Loss when  = 0:995
V alue Loss=Cost Parameter FC 2XFC 3XFC 4XFC 5XFC
(GPO  BAU)=BAU in 1998 dollars 0:68% 2:14% 4:06% 6:37% 9:02%
4. Other Equibria I - BAU Sanctions
In this section we take a rst step towards characterizing other equilibria in our
model; we analyze the third-best problem: maximize a weighted sum of country
payo¤s when the emission policies are incentive-compatible under the threat of BAU
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emissions. There are three main results. First, for all discount factors, the third-
best solution qualitatively mirrors the BAU and GPO solutions; there is a constant
emission level a
0
i that country i emits, independently of the stock of GHGs. Second,
the set of sustainable emissions includes the BAU level but is strictly larger than that.
In particular, the minimum incentive-compatible emission level is strictly lower than
the BAU level, and that is true for every country. Hence, BAU sanctions are strictly
welfare improving for all countries and all discount factors. Third, if discount factors
are high enough, then, in fact, the GPO emission levels are themselves the third-best
solution. Finally, we provide empirical evidence for these results.
4.1. BAU Sanctions: Third-Best and Minimum Emissions. Let x = (xi)
be a vector of positive numbers, one for each country. A Third-Best Optimum (TBO)
corresponding to x is a prole of "norm" strategies that maximizes the weighted sum
of country payo¤s,
v =
X
i
xivi; (12)
subject to BAU reversion, i.e., subject to the constraint - detailed below - that should
any country i not follow the norm, all countries would switch to BAU emissions forever
after from the following period. As before, and without loss of generality, we may
take the weights, xi, to sum to 1. The following result characterizes the TBO:
Proposition 1 There exists a vector of constant emission levels a0 such that
country is TBO strategy is to use a constant emission equal to a
0
i in all periods and
after all histories in which no country defects, where a
0
i belongs to a set that satises
the incentive constraint
hi(eai)  wi(eai + X
j 6=i
eaj)  hi(ai )  wi(ai + X
j 6=i
aj);8i
It might help to sketch the derivation of the simple incentive constraint above.
Consider any constant emission level ea = ea1; ea2; ::::eaI . It can be easily shown that
this emission level is sustainable as an equilibrium norm provided
hi(eai)  cig+ [eui wi(g+X
j
eaj)]  hi(ai)  cig+ [ui  wi(g+ai+X
j 6=i
eaj)]; 8ai; i
(13)
where eui and ui are the present discounted values of emission policies that emit at
constant rates of, respectively, ea and a into the innite future - recall that in the
event of a deviation, the threat is to revert to BAU emissions a forever. In turn,
the above equation can be simplied to
hi(eai)  wieai + eui  hi(ai)  wiai + ui ; 8ai; i:
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From Eq. 8 - the characterization of the BAU emission level - it follows that the
deviation prots - the RHS of the equation above - is maximized at ai . Using that
fact and the denitions of eui and ui ,12 the incentive constraint can be rewritten in
the form above.
It is immediate that the BAU emission policy is sustainable by the threat of
BAU reversion - of course! - since the inequality is trivially satised when eai = ai .
What is also not very di¢ cult to show is that the GPO emission policy also becomes
sustainable at a high enough . Formally, we have:
Proposition 2 a) The highest welfare that is achievable under the threat of BAU
emissions is at least as high as u.
b) Suppose that the GPO values under equal country weighting, (xi = xj for all
i,j) Pareto-dominates the BAU solution for all high   0 Then, there is a cut-o¤
discount factor e 2 (0; 1 )such that, above it, the GPO emission policy is sustainable
as an equibrium norm.
Consider the minimum emission problem:
Min
X
i
eai
over all incentive-compatible emission levels, i.e., over all ea that satisfy the incen-
tive constraint above. The next proposition shows that there is a unique solution to
the problem and, for all , it is strictly smaller than the BAU emission level a.
Proposition 3 a) There is a unique emission level a that is the minimum emis-
sion level sustainable by the threat of BAU reversion.
b) For all , the minimum emission level is strictly lower than the BAU level, i.e.,
a <<a.
4.2. BAU Sanctions: Numerical Evidence on Minimum Emissions. In
this subsection we present empirical evidence on the emission cuts that are sustainable
under the threat of BAU sanctions. We focus on minimum emission levels a and show
that this is for most regions even lower than the GPO levels. There is one signicant
exception to this and that is Eastern Europe where GPO levels are higher than
the lowest that BAU sanctions will deliver. We also present come country-specic
evidence. Again countries from the ex-Soviet Bloc are the ones where signicant cuts
appear most di¢ cult to implement; for Russia and Ukraine the GPO emission levels
are, respectively, 39% and 40% lower than the BAU emission levels but the maximum
sustainable cuts are only 20% and 19% respectively.
In Tables 5 and 6 below, MIN refers to the minimum emission level a.
12Recall - see Eq. 9 - ui =
hi(ai) wi
P
aj
1  and eui = hi(eai) wiPeaj1  .
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Table 5 - Minimum Emissions Under BAU Sanctions;  = 0:97 and Fankhauser
costs:
Region=Emissions BAU (Gtc) GPO (Gtc) MIN (Gtc)
United States 1:50 1:36 1:22
Western Europe 0:86 0:79 0:67
Other High Income 0:59 0:53 0:45
Eastern Europe 0:74 0:45 0:54
Middle Income (MI) 0:41 0:36 0:28
Lower MI 0:58 0:41 0:32
China 0:85 0:56 0:45
Lower Income 0:66 0:48 0:43
Total 6:18 4:93 4:36
Table 6 - A Comparison of Minimum Emissions and GPO Emissions for Selected
Countries:
Country=Emissions MIN GPO
BAU
(%)
UnitedStates  9%
Brazil  31%
China  21%
India  9%
Korea DPR +22%
Poland +5%
Russia +17%
Ukraine +21%
5. Asymmetry
One critical feature of the climate change problem is that countries di¤er greatly in
the consequences they are likely to su¤er. Whereas low-lying places like Bangladesh
may see parts of their countries washed away by rising sea-waters, or equatorial
countries may become uninhabitably hot, northern regions of the world such as parts
of North America and northern Europe will bear limited costs and may even benet
from longer growing seasons and lower heating costs in the winter. In this section we
analyze the question: (how) does asymmetry (in costs) limit the extent of sustainable
cuts? Optimal cuts? What are the welfare consequences of asymmetry?
As in the last section, we will limit attention to equilibria that are sustainable by
the threat of reversion to the BAU equilibrium. For this section, we will focus on
 Two Countries, i.e., I = 2
The restriction is imposed for clarity. We study two countries - or two regions -
because it is easier to dene asymmetry in terms of a single-dimensional parameter
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(namely the di¤erence in the costs c1 and c2) and it is less obvious what we mean by
an increasein asymmetry when we have I costs.
5.1. Incentives and Welfare. No matter what emissions policy we consider,
when country i0s marginal cost to global warming, ci increases, its total and marginal
lifetime cost increases. As we saw in Section 3, the emission in any period t can be
treated in isolation a and costs ci
1  . Hence when ci increases, everything else being
equal, country i should be willing to cut emissions since benets are unchanged and
the marginal cost is higher. And conversely for a decrease in costs.
The problem though is that everything else does not actually remain unchanged
when costs change. In particular, the sanction, i.e., the BAU solution, itself changes
with the cost. In principle then, the comparative statics of incentives are unclear;
whereas, a higher cost makes cheating on a treaty less protable it also makes the
sanction to be su¤ered less severe. In this subsection we show that nevertheless the
rst e¤ect always triumphs; a higher cost country will agree to every cut that a lower
cost country agrees to - and possibly more.
Without loss of generality, let us consider cost changes in which it is c1 that
decreases while c2 increases. It might help to think of country 1 as a proxy for the
developed North and country 2 as the developing South.
Consider any constant emissions policy with emissions at rate ea. As we saw in
the previous section, this policy is incentive-compatible - under BAU reversion - if
hi(eai)  wi(eai +  eaj)  hi(ai )  wi(ai + aj); i = 1; 2; i 6= j
The policy is strictly incentive-compatible for country i if the inequality holds
strictly. A study of the incentive constraint yields the following conclusion: the
country whose cost increases is willing to make larger cuts and the exact opposite is
true for countries whose cost decreases.
Theorem 3. For every emission vector ea less than the BAU vector a, a decrease in
c1 and a simultaneous increase in c2 changes incentives as follows: if (ea1;ea2) is incen-
tive compatible (under costs c1 and c2) then it becomes strictly incentive-compatible
for country 2 (the South) under the new costs. Likewise, if ea is just compatible
for country 1 (the North) before the cost change, then it is no longer incentive-
compatible under the new costs.
Recall the symmetric third-best problem:
Max V1(g; a) + V2(g; a); (14)
where Vi(g; a) is country i0s lifetime payo¤from emission policy a(:) - and this emission
policy is incentive compatible under the threat of BAU reversion. Denote cost
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asymmetry by a single-dimensional parameter d where d = 0 corresponds to equal
costs and cost asymmetry increases as d increases (the Norths costs decrease and the
Souths increase).13. The third-best welfare result is:
Theorem 4. Suppose that the GPO is sustainable as a third-best equilibrium when
costs are equal, d = 0. Overall welfare, as measured by the sum of country payo¤s
are decreasing in cost asymmetry. It remains unchanged for small asymmetry - till
a cut-o¤ asymmetry level bd - and thereafter strictly decreases.
5.2. Asymmetry: Some Numbers. In this subsection the two countries are
the US (country 1) and China (country 2) whose actual costs are quite similar to
each other. A table illustrates the third-best as it changes with asymmetry d.
Table 7 - Third-Best Emission Levels as a function of cost di¤erence d:
d US (GtC) China (GtC)
0:2 1:46400 0:77206
0:3 1:46369 0:77201
0:4 1:46369 0:77201
0:5 1:46048 0:77971
0:6 1:45601 0:79646
0:7 1:45332 0:81295
6. Other Equilibria II - A Complete Characterization of SPE
In this section we will characterize all possible subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) of
the model. We will do that in two steps. In Section 6.1 we will characterize the SPE
payo¤ correspondence. This characterization will be then used in Section 6.2 to study
the extreme equilibria - the best and the worst equilibria. Although the theoretical
analysis is complete, numerical estimates of extreme equilibria - and especially the
worst equilibrium - are more di¢ cult to compute. That exercise is left for future
research.
6.1. The Equilibrium Payo¤ Correspondence. We will show that the SPE
payo¤ correspondence has a surprising simplicity; the set of equilibrium payo¤s at
a level g is a simple linear translate of the set of equilibrium payo¤s from some
benchmark level, say, g = 0. Consequently, it will be seen that the set of emission
levels that can arise in equilibrium from level g is identical to those that can arise
from equilibrium play at a GHG level of 0. Note the fact that the set of equilibrium
13Furthermore, the parametrization is done in such a fashion that the total cost, w1+w2, remains
unchanged.
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possibilities is invariant to the level of g, is perfectly consistent with the possibility
that in a particular equilibrium, emission levels vary with g. (Indeed we will see some
of those equilibria in Section 7.) However, the invariance property will make for a
particularly simple characterization of the best and worst equilibria.
Let (g) denote the set of equilibrium payo¤ vectors with initial state g, i.e., each
element of (g) is the payo¤ to some SPE starting from g.
Theorem 5. The equilibrium payo¤ correspondence  is linear; there is a compact
set U  <I such that for every initial state g
(g) = U   fw1g; w2g; :::wIgg;
where wi = ci1  , i = 1; ::I. In particular, consider any SPE, any period t and any
history of play up until t. Then the payo¤ vector for the continuation strategies must
necessarily be of the form
V   (w1gt; w2gt; :::wIgt)
where V 2 U (and gt is the state at period t).
The theorem is proved by way of a bootstrap argument. We presume that a
(candidate) payo¤ set has this invariance and show that the linear structure of the
model conrms the conjecture. Consequently, we generate another candidate payo¤
set - which is also state invariant. Then we look for a xed point of that operator.14
6.2. Extreme Equilibria. We will now use the result of the previous subsection
to characterize the best - and the worst - equilibria in the global climate change
game. Consider the second-best problem (from initial state g and for a given vector
of welfare weights x = (xi; i = 1; :: I)), i.e., the problem of maximizing a weighted
sum of equilibrium payo¤s:
max
IX
i=1
xiVi(g), V (g) 2 (g):
Note that we consider all possible equilibria, i.e., we consider equilibria that choose
to condition on current and past GHG levels as well as equilibria that do not. The
result states that the best equilibrium need not condition on GHG levels:
14In other words, we employ a generalized version of the Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990)
operator to generate the SPE correspondence. We need to generalize the APS argument since that
was formulated for repeated games alone.
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Theorem 6. There exists a constant emission level a  a1; a2; ::::aI - such that no
matter what the initial level of GHG, the second-best policy is to emit at the constant
rate a. In the event of a deviation from this constant emissions policy by country i,
play proceeds to i0s worst equilibrium. Furthermore, the second-best emission rate is
always strictly lower than the BAU rate, i.e., a < a. Above a critical discount factor
(less than 1), the second-best rate coincides with the GPO emission rate ba.
The theorem is attractive for two reasons: rst, it says that the best possible
equilibrium behavior is no more complicated than BAU behavior; so there is no
argument for delaying a treaty (to cut emissions) merely because the status quo is
simple. Second, the cut required to implement the second-best policy is an across the
board cut - independently of anything else, country i should cut its emissions by the
amount ai   ai.15
Sanctions will be required if countries break with the second-best policy16 and
without loss of generality we can restrict attention to the worst such sanction. We
turn now to a characterization of this worst equilibrium (for, say, country i). One
denition will be useful for this purpose:
Denition 1. An i   less second-best equilibrium is the solution to a second-best
problem in which the welfare weight of i is set equal to zero, i.e., xi = 0.
By the previous theorem, every such problem has a solution in which on the
equilibrium path, emissions are a constant. Denote that emission level a(x i):
Theorem 7. There exists a highemission level a(i) (with
P
j 6=i aj(i) >
P
j 6=i a

j)
and an i  less second-best equilibrium a(x i) such that country is worst equilibrium
is:
1. Each country emits at rate aj(i) for one period (no matter what g is), j = 1; ::I.
2. From the second period onwards, each country emits at the constant rate
aj(x i), j = 1; ::I.
And if any country k deviates at either stages 1 or 2, play switches to k0s worst
equilibrium from the very next period after the deviation.
15Our model operates at the aggregative level alone and, in particular, we do not address the
issue of how national governments will implement cuts that they agree to (in the national interest).
However, it seems quite likely that an across the board cut will be easier to implement - and will be
perceived to be fairer to all - than one which is sensitively tied to levels of GHG.
16A major criticism of the Kyoto accord is that it did not incorporate sanctions and hence would
never be carried out. For details, see Barrett (2003, Chapter 15) and the further discussion in
Section 8.
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Put another way, for every country i, a sanction is made up of two emission rates,
a(i) and a(x i). The former imposes immediate costs on country i. The way it
does so is by increasing the emission levels of countries j 6= i. The e¤ect of this
is a temporary increase in incremental GHG but due to the irreversibility of gas
accumulation, a permament increase in country i0s costs, enough of an increase to
wipe out any immediate gains that the country might have got from the deviation.
Of course this additional emission also increases country j0s costs. For the punishing
countries, however, this increase is o¤set by the subsequent permanent change, the
switch to the emission vector a(x i), which permamently increases their quota at the
expense of country i0s.
The fact that there is a temporary loosening of environmental regulations as
part of environmental sanctions is reminiscent of GATT rules where tari¤s can be
temporarily imposed by countries that seek to punish illegitimate trade practices on
the part of others.
7. Greenhouse Trap
In every equilibrium that we have studied so far - BAU, the third and second-best -
each country emits at a constant rate regardless of GHG level. Hence, the dynamics
of every such equilibrium is also simple; at a constant cumulative rate A, the stock of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) converges to a steady-state of A
1  . Put yet another way,
the current GHG level has no long-term implication.
In this section we demonstrate the richness of the model by identifying some MPE
in which current GHG levels matter, MPE in which there is a so-called greenhouse
trap. If the world starts below some critical level of GHG, say eg, then it grows no
farther than that level. However if the system starts above eg - or somehow crosses into
the higher region - then greenhouse gases are trapped into growing - and eventually
grow to the BAU steady-state.
The key to these equilibria is a richer interaction between the (Markov) emission
levels of country i and the rest of the world. In particular, we will consider emission
policies that are Markovian but not constant, say an emission policy (vector) such
as a(g). Now country i has an incentive - everything else being equal - to emit in
such a fashion that the global stock of GHG grows towards a region where a i(:) are
lower. Of course every country has such an incentive and so each country will wish
to drive gt towards a region where emission levels are low for the other countries.
Hence, the conjecture for the group as a whole is that there will be MPE with regions
of abnormallylow emissions and every country will a) have an incentive to stay in
such regions once the system gets there and b) have an incentive to participate in
pushing the system towards such regions.
The conjecture is almost correct. We will show that there are indeed such equilib-
ria - in fact there are many - each of which has such a goodregion of low emissions.
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Furthermore, from most - but not all - initial GHG levels outside this good region,
countries will have an incentive to drive the system to the good region. The one
additional complication is that in order for there to be a good region there must also
be some badregion (of high emissions) from which countries do not nd their way
to the good region. The presence of a bad region - and the associated spectre of
landing there - is what keeps the countries honest in the good region.17
To keep the exposition simple, we are going to only present results for the sym-
metric case.18 Accordingly, when we speak of the Pareto optimal solution we will
refer to the symmetric solution - and to avoid clutter we will simply denote that solu-
tion by ba (with associated steady state bg). We shall present two results of increasing
generality.
Consider the following symmetric Markovian strategy a(:): if the GHG level is
below the Pareto optimal steady state bg, emissions take the game immediately to
that state. On the other hand, if the GHG level exceeds bg, then emissions are at the
(high) BAU level of a. In other words,
a(g) =
bg   g
I
, g  bg
= a; g > bg
In the terminology of the immediately preceding discussion, the region below the
Pareto optimal steady state bg is the goodregion of (relatively) low emission levels
whereas the region above is the badregion of high emissions. Consider the following
condition (L for large)), which says that the BAU emission level is su¢ ciently
larger than the GPO level:
Condition L:
aba > max( II   1 ; 11   );
where (recall) I is the number of players and  is the persistence of CO2 in the
earths atmosphere.19
17Readers familiar with repeated games will note the obvious connection with the idea of history-
dependent punishments. The point to note though is that these are not history-dependent equilibria
since they only depend on the GHG level and not on past emissions. (Hence they are more di¢ cult
to construct.) They are also more sparing in terms of informational requirements since they do not
require i to condition on (or even know) past emission levels of the other countries.
18The rst of the two results is easily generalized to the asymmetric case.
19Since II 1 approaches 1 for I large, Condition L really boils down to
aba  11  whenever we have
a large number of players. This condition will always hold under standard asymptotic conditions
on h. To see this note that simple algebra shows that h
0(ba)
h0(a) = I and hence
aba is large whenever I
is large.
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Theorem 8. Suppose that Condition L holds. Then there is a cut-o¤ value of the
discount factor - say b - such that a(:) is an MPE for all   b. In such an equilibrium,
the GHG level converges in one period to the Pareto optimal steady state bg if the
initial level is below bg whereas it converges asymptotically to the BAU steady state
g if the initial level is above bg.
The reader might wonder how useful this last theorem is if we suspect that the
world is currently already past the Pareto optimal steady state.20 This leads to the
question: are there MPE that have steady states less than the BAU steady state of
g (but higher than the desired - but unattainable - steady state of bg)?
We will now demonstrate the existence of MPE that di¤ers in three ways from
the one above. First, in addition to the good and bad regions, there will be a latent
goodregion - a region of low GHG levels from which the stock will gradually grow
till it reaches the good region (whereupon it will stay there). Second, the good region
(with emissions lower than the BAU level a) will extend beyond the Pareto optimal
steady state bg; in fact it will extend quite close to the BAU steady state g. (So
no matter where the world is today, however close to the worst possibility, we can
still put the brakes on in an incentive-compatible way!) Third, we will considerably
weaken Condition L.
Let eg be any GHG level that is higher than bg but no more than (I 1)
I
g; eg will be
our candidate low steady state. We will consider Markov strategies in which stocks
from a left neighborhood of eg (to be dened shortly) come in one step to eg and stocks
above eg exhibit BAU behavior:
ea(g) = a; g > eg (15)
=
eg   g
I
, eg1  g  eg
where eg1  I   1
I
eg:
For stocks lower than eg1, the latent goodregion, the emission levels will be such
that GHG levels grow (gradually) till they get into the [eg1; eg] region. These emission
levels cannot however be solved for in closed form. Instead we will employ a xed
point argument to show the following:
Theorem 9. Suppose that
aba > II   1 :
20It is unclear whether the world is past bg or not. Some of the public policy concern is not so
much with current levels of GHG as with what level might eventually be attained at the current
rates of accumulation.
A Strategic Analysis of Global Warming: Theory and Some Numbers 23
Then there is a cut-o¤ value of the discount factor - say e - such that for all   e,
there is a MPE ea(:) whose behavior above eg1 is as given above. Below eg1, the stock
grows although it remains below eg, i.e.,
g + Iea(g) 2 (g; eg); for all g < eg:
In such an equilibrium, the GHG level converges to the steady state eg if the initial
level is below it whereas it converges asymptotically to the BAU steady state g if
the initial level is above eg.
8. Literature Review and Concluding Remarks
Symmetric dynamic commons games have been studied by a number of authors,
including Levhari and Mirman (1980), Sundaram (1989), Sobel (1990), Benhabib
and Radner (1992), Rustichini (1992), Dutta and Sundaram (1992, 1993), Sorger
(1998), etc.21 Although these papers have greatly added to our understanding of the
problem, none of them o¤er a full characterization of equilibria. We do just that in
this paper (and, additionally, analyze the e¤ect of asymmetry).
A large volume of literature exists on the economics of climate change. A central
question there is to determine the level of emissions that is globally optimal. An
excellent example of this is Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). A smaller volume of litera-
ture emphasizes the need for treaties to be self-enforcing, i.e., the need for a strategic
analysis of the problem. (But see Barrett (2003) and Finus (2001).) Where we
depart from the existing strategic literature is in the dynamic modelling; we allow
GHGs to accumulate and stay in the environment for a (possibly long) period of time.
(Technically, existing analyses are all static one-shot games or purely repeated games
which implies that the state variable, gas stock, remains constant over time.)
In terms of conclusions, our ndings are similar in terms of welfare loss to other
authors, including those who focus on the rst-best issue. Nordhaus and Boyer
(2000) calculate a United States loss from global climate change of the order of 0.5%
of GDP (for doubling of pre-industrial levels); other estimates have been in the 1% to
2% range. This agrees with our ndings of a decrease in global welfare (respectively,
US welfare) in the range of 0.6% to 2% (respectively, 0.3% to 1%) for di¤erent discount
rates with our benchmark damage cost coe¢ cients. Where we di¤er is in the size of
the emission cuts that our model predicts. Whereas Kyoto had called for cuts in the
10% range relative to 1990 levels and some of the literature has proposed that even
that is too much to be globally optimal - see (Nordhaus and Boyer) - our numerical
computations ask for much deeper emission cuts. We conjecture that the dynamic
element of our model - that gases can persist in the atmosphere for a hundred years
21Some of these papers allow asymmetry; however, none of them analyzes the e¤ect of asymmetry
on the equilibria.
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or more, which is in line with the known evidence - make the deeper cuts optimal.
Furthermore, our results for both potential welfare increases and emission cuts are
quite sensitive to increases in the damage cost coe¢ cients.
The Kyoto Protocol appears not to be the basis of a self-enforcing treaty, prin-
cipally because it does not build in any e¤ective sanctions that would be applied if
countries fail to meet their targets. This contrasts with GATT and its attendant insti-
tutional structure, the WTO. All that is said in the Kyoto protocol - in Article 18 - is
that procedures and mechanisms for compliance should be determined by the parties
at their rst meeting and should include an indicative list of consequences. Sub-
sequently, at the Hague November 2000 meeting, the most popular proposal (which
came from the Dutch Environment Minister Jan Pronk) was that countries would
face an escalating series of target reductions in the future if they failed to comply in
the current stage. A watered-down version of this proposal was adopted in Bonn
in March 2001, after the United States had pulled out of the treaty. Yet even this
version had several problems - in principle, countries could postpone retribution in-
denitely, and the base from which the enhanced reduction would be required would
be worked out in the future, etc. (See Finus (2001), Chapter 15.) One contribution
of this paper is that it shows that fairly simple sanctions - BAU reversion - can be
quite e¤ective and even the most severe sanctions - the worst equilibria - are fairly
simple.
In Dutta and Radner (2004b) we generalize our current model to allow for popu-
lation change and demonstrate qualitatively similar theoretical results. In Dutta and
Radner (2004a) we allowed for simple technological change and present some theo-
retical and numerical results on the GPO and BAU solutions. In Dutta and Radner
(2004c) we incorporate capital accumulation (and technical change). The main ques-
tion that we hope to address in that model is: (when) does the prevention of global
warming slow down the rate of economic growth? A second question that we hope to
look at is: (how) does asymmetry in the current level of economic development a¤ect
sustainability of agreements about emission cuts. We have some preliminary results
on the rst question but not a complete solution.
9. Appendix - Proofs
9.1. Global Pareto Optima and BAU Equilibrium. Proof of Theorem
1: We shall show by dynamic programming arguments that the Pareto-optimal value
function is of the form bV =PIi=1 xi[bui wi _g]. We need to be able to nd the constantsbui to satisfy:
IX
i=1
xi[bui   wig] =Maxa1;::aI IX
i=1
xi[hi(ai)  cig + (bui   wi(g + IX
j=1
aj))] (16)
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Collecting terms that need maximization we can reduce the equation above to
IX
i=1
xibui =Maxa1;::aI IX
i=1
xi[hi(ai)  wi
IX
j=1
aj] (17)
It is clear that the solution to this system is the same for all g; call this (rst-best)
solution bai. Elementary algebra reveals that
bui = hi(bai)  wiPIj=1 baj
1   and wi =
ci
1  
It is also obvious that xih0i(a^i) = w, where w =
PI
i=1 xiwi.
Proof of Theorem 2: Consider any constant emission strategy for players
other than i; call these constants aj. We shall now show by dynamic program-
ming arguments that the best response value function is of the form ui   wi _g, where
ui =
hi(a

i ) wi(ai+
P
j 6=i aj)
1  . We therefore need to show that:
ui   wi _g =Maxai [hi(ai)  cig + (ui   wi(g + ai +
X
j 6=i
aj)] (18)
Collecting the terms that need maximization we can reduce the above equation
to
ui =Maxai [h(ai)  wiai] (19)
It is clear that the solution to this system is the same for all g and equals ai where
h0i(a

i ) = wi.
9.2. Equilibria Sustained by BAU Sanctions. Proof of Proposition 1:
Recall that in the third-best problem we maximize a weighted sum of the countries
payo¤s
v =
X
i
xivi;
subject to BAU reversion. The proof follows the lines of that for the analogous
result on the second-best, i.e., along the lines of the proof of Theorems 6 and 7 (see
below). Evidently, equilibria that are sustained by the threat of BAU reversion
are SPE and hence their values belong to the SPE payo¤ correspondence that we
identied in Theorem 6 - U   fw1g; w2g; :::wIgg where U is a compact subset of <I .
Dene therefore the set of incentive-compatible emission vectors a - associated with
the threat of BAU reversion - as:
A = fa 2 <I+: hi(ai) + (u
0
i   wiai)  h(eai) + (ui   wieai); 8eai; i; for some u0 2 Ug
(20)
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where ui =
hi(ai*) wi
PI
j=1 aj*
1  is the BAU equilibrium payo¤.
The third-best equilibrium is therefore found by solving the following problem:
Maxai;ui
IX
i=1
xi
"
hi(ai) + [u
0
i   wi
IX
k=1
ak]
#
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint Eq. 20. Since the constraint is
independent of g - and so is the objective function - it follows that the solution is as
well. The proposition is proved.
Proof of Proposition 2: The only part left to prove is part b). Note that as
 " 1, the incentive constraint, Eq. 20, becomes
hi(eai)  wi(1)(eai +X
j 6=i
eaj)  hi(ai )  wi(1)(ai +X
j 6=i
aj); 8i (21)
where wi(1) = lim"1wi() = lim"1 ci1  =
ci
1  : The expression on the LHS,
hi(eai) wi(1)Pj eaj, is precisely the long-run average (LRA) value from a policy that
emits at the constant rate ea. In particular then, if we pick the candidate ea to be
the GPO emission under the LRA criterion with equal weights for all countries, the
incentive constraint Eq. 21 is satised by the denition of GPO, at  = 1. Add to
that a) that the LRA GPO is the limit of discounted average GPO values (see, Dutta
(1991)) and b) the assumption that the equal weight GPO solution Pareto-dominates
the BAU value for all high discount factors. The proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 3: We shall rst prove part b). Start then at the BAU
solution a and consider a reduction of every countrys emission by an amount ". We
shall show that the emission vector a   " is sustainable by the BAU sanction for
appropriately small but positive ". Note that the LHS of the incentive constraint,
Eq. 20, becomes
hi(a

i   ")  wi(ai   "+ 
X
j 6=i
(aj   "))
and that can be rewritten as
hi(a

i )  wi(ai + 
X
j 6=i
(aj   "))  [h
0
i(z

i )  wi]"
for some zi 2 (ai   "; ai ). That in turn equals
hi(a

i )  wi(ai + 
X
j 6=i
aj) +
n
2wi(I   1)  [h0i(zi )  wi]
o
"
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As " # 0, zi ! ai . Since h0i(ai )  wi = 0, it follows that 2wi(I   1)  [h0i(zi ) 
wi] > 0 for small ". In particular, the incentive constarint
hi(a

i   ")  wi(ai   "+ 
X
j 6=i
(aj   "))  hi(ai )  wi(ai + 
X
j 6=i
aj); 8i (22)
holds. The proof of part b) is complete.
At the minimum incentive-compatible emission level, every IC constraint must
hold with equality. Consider instead the alternative case, i.e., suppose the constraint
is a strict inequality for country j. In that case we can further reduce that countrys
emission without violating its constraint. However lowering j0s emission only helps
satisfy every other countrys constraint. Hence, we will have lowered total emissions
without violating incentive constraints, which is a contradiction.
Rewriting the incentive constraints as equalities yields
hi(ai)  wi(ai + 
X
j 6=i
aj) = 	i; 8i
where 	i = hi(ai )   wi(ai + 
P
j 6=i a

j). Let us suppose that a is a solution to
the emission minimization problem and let A =
P
i ai. Rewriting the immediately
preceding equation we have
hi(ai)  (1  )wiai = 	i + 2wiA
Given the strict concavity of h, it is evident that ai is uniquely dened by the
above equation. The proof is complete.
9.3. Asymmetry. Proposition 1 above greatly simplies the incentive analysis
for the third-best problem since we can now restrict ourselves to constant emissions
policies and the consequent incentive constraint:
hi(ai)  wi(ai + aj)  hi(ai )  wi(ai + aj); i; and for j 6= i (23)
Proof of Theorem 3: Consider a decrease in w1 (to w
0
1) and a simultaneous
increase in w2. Denote Si(a) as the incentive slack of country i, i.e.,
Si(a) = hi(ai)  wi(ai + aj)  [hi(ai )  wi(ai + aj)]
Similarly, denote the incentive slack under the new (lower) costs S
0
i. Evidently,
for country 1, the di¤erence in the two slacks, S
0
1(a)  S1(a) equals
fh1(a1)  w0i(a1 + a2)  [h1(a1)  wi(a1 + a2)]g
 fh1(a01 )  w
0
i(a
0
1 + a
0
2 )  [h1(a1)  wi(a1 + a2)]g
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where a
0
is the BAU emission level for costs w0. Call the term in the rst (curly)
bracket, fg1 - and the second one fg2. Simple algebra yields
fg1 = (w1   w01)[a1 + a2]: (24)
Note that h1(a
0
1 )  w01(a01 ) > h1(a1)  w01(a1) by the denition of a01 . Further-
more, a
0
2 < a

2 since country 2s costs have gone up. Combining those two facts we
have that
fg2 > h1(a1)  w
0
1(a

1 + a

2)  [h1(a1)  w1(a1 + a2) (25)
= (w1   w01)[a1 + a2]
Since a1 + a

2  a1 + a2, it further follows fg2 > fg1; i.e., S 01(a)   S1(a) = fg1
  fg2 < 0.
To prove the result for country 2, we mimic the above argument except for the fact
that we use instead the observations that i) h2(a2)   w2(a2) > h2(a02 )   w2(a02 )
and ii) that a
0
1 > a

1 since country 1s costs have gone down. The theorem is proved.
Proof of Theorem 4: Consider starting from the symmetric situation where
c1 = c2 or, equivalently, the symmetric situation where the lifetime costs are equal,
i.e., w1 = c11  =
c2
1  = w2. Now consider varying the costs in a manner that
the costs of country 1 "South" are increased while those of country 2 "North" are
decreased. Let is measure the asymmetry in costs by the di¤erence d = c1   c2 or,
equivalently, the di¤erence in lifetime costs d
1  =  = w1   w2. In other words,
we shall consider an increase in asymmetry as exemplied by an increase in d (or ).
Furthermore, so as to ensure that the only e¤ect is that of an increase in asymmetry,
we shall hold constant the sum of the two costs w1 + w2.
By hypothesis, the GPO is third-best when w1 = w2: Even when the cost dif-
ference becomes positive, the GPO continues to be incentive-compatible for both
countries as long as d is small. However, beyond a cut-o¤ value, it is no longer
incentive-compatible for the low cost country 2 "South" (see Lemma 1). At that
point, in the third-best solution only one of the incentive constraints binds with a
strict inequality. Furthermore, and again from Lemma 1 above, that has to be the
incentive constraint for country 1 (the higher cost country).
So consider two di¤erent 1 and 2, say 1 > 2 and let a1 = (a11; a
1
2) and a
2
=(a21; a
2
2) be the corresponding third-best emission vectors. Since the incentive con-
straint for country 1 "South" is slack, it follows that if 1 is chosen su¢ ciently close
to 2, then a11is also incentive compatible at 
2. By Lemma 1 above, country 2s
incentive region shrinks as its costs decrease, i.e., its emission under 1, a12, must also
have been incentive compatible at 2. Putting the two together, the emission vector
a1 is incentive compatible at 2 but the choice made for that parameter is a2. That
implies that total welfare is higher at a2 than at a1 at the parameter 2. But since
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the total welfare function is unchanged as the cost di¤erence changes - since w1+w2
is constant - it follows that total welfare is lower at 1 compared to 2.
9.4. All Equilibria. Proof of Theorem 5: We shall employ the generaliza-
tion of the Dynamic Programming Bellman equation that was introduced by Abreu-
Pearce-Stachetti (1990) to study the set of SPE in repeated games. Let us start with
the conjecture that the correspondence of SPE payo¤s, V , has the structure claimed
in the result, i.e., is of the form U   fw1g; w2g; :::wIgg where U is a compact subset
of <I . Let ui denote the vector in U that gives country i the worst payo¤, i.e.,
ui = min
ui
fu 2 Ug
and denote i0s payo¤in that minimum as uii. Dene the set of incentive-compatible
emission vectors a - associated with this candidate equilibrium payo¤ set - as:
A = fa 2 <I+: hi(ai) + (u
0
i   wiai)  h(eai) + (uii   wieai); 8eai; i; for some u0 2 Ug
(26)
Now dene the APS operator BV (that takes the correspondence V into another
correspondence) as follows:
BV = fv(:): 9 selections a(:) and u(:; :) satisfying a(g) 2 A; and u(g0; g) 2 U , 8g0; g
vi(g) = hi(ai)  cig + (ui(g +
IX
j=1
aj(g); g)  wi(g +
IX
j=1
aj(g)))g
Note that v(:) can be rewritten as
vi(g) = [hi(ai) + (ui(g +
IX
j=1
aj(g); g)  wi
IX
j=1
aj(g))]  wig
Note from the incentive set A that exactly the same set of actions satisfy the
incentive constraint at every value of g. By hypothesis the continuation payo¤s
u(g0; g) 2 U , a set that is independent of g as well. It follows that BV is a corre-
spondence of the same form as V , i.e., BV = U 0   fw1g; w2g; ::: wIgg for some U 0
that is a subset of <I . Standard arguments - using the Maximum theorem - can be
employed to show that U 0 must be a compact set as well.
Start then with a set U0 (or correspondence V0) that is compact and large, i.e.,
one that contains all feasible payo¤s in the game. Dene U1 via the APS operator
as above - U1 is compact as well. It must also be non-empty because it must contain
the BAU payo¤ u. By denition, U1  U0. Dene Un recursively in this fashion. It
is easy to check that the operator is monotone and hence Un is a decreasing sequence
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of non-empty compact sets. Associated with each is the correspondence Vn = Un  
fw1g; w2g; :::wIgg. Let U be the intersection of these Un sets. APS type arguments
then show that BV = V and that V contains all SPE payo¤s. The theorem is
proved.
Proof of Theorem 6: Given the previous theorem, the second-best equilibrium
is found by solving the following problem:
Max
a;u(:;g)2U
IX
i=1
xi
"
hi(ai) + [ui(g +
IX
k=1
ak; g)  wi
IX
k=1
ak]
#
where, for every g, u(g +
PI
k=1 ak; g) 2 U and the emissions have to satisfy the
incentive compatibility constraint
hj(aj) + (uj(g +
IX
k=1
aj; g)  wjaj)  hj(eaj) + (ujj   wjeaj); 8eaj; j
Since the constraint is independent of g - and so is the objective function - it follows
that the solution is as well.
Proof of Theorem 7: In light of our previous results, the worst equilibrium for
player i, if the state is g, is a solution to the following problem:
Mina;u(:;g)2U hi(ai) + [ui(g +
IX
k=1
ak; g)  wi
IX
k=1
ak] (27)
s:t: hj(aj) + (uj(g +
IX
k=1
aj; g)  wjaj)  hj(eaj) + (ujj   wjeaj); 8eaj; j (28)
Since u(:; g) 2 U - a state independent set - it follows that the solution to the
problem is going to be state independent as well. Furthermore, by arguments that we
have seen before, it is clear that if player j is going to deviate (and expects the worst
equilibrium for her to be the continuation regardless of how much she deviated by),
then her optimal deviation is aj . In other words, Eqs. (27) and (28) can be simplied
to yield the following:
ui =Mina;eu2U hi(ai) + [eui   wi IX
k=1
ak] (29)
s:t: hj(aj) + (euj   wjaj)  hj(aj) + (ujj   wjaj); 8j (30)
Note that it must be the case that the incentive constraint for player i - whose
worst equilibrium we are analyzing - is binding in the above problem. If not, we can
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perturb ai in such a manner - without changing aj, j 6= i, such that hi(ai)  wiai is
lowered and player i0s incentive constraint continues to be satised. Since the others
actions do not change, their incentives are untouched and we lower the value of the
minimand in Eq. (29). In light of that observation we can rewrite the problem as
Maxa;eu2U X
k 6=i
ak
s:t: hj(aj) + (euj   wjaj)  hj(aj) + (ujj   wjaj); 8j (31)
It immediately follows that in the solution, a(i),
P
j 6=i aj(i) 
P
j 6=i a

j . We know
however that there are equilibrium payo¤s that are strictly higher than the BAU pay-
o¤s (for example, the third-best payo¤s are strictly higher). Hence from the incentive
constraints it follows that there are emission vectors for the other players that are
incentive compatible and whose sum is strictly higher than the BAU emissions.
A little reection also shows that the optimization problem of Eq. (31) must be
equivalent to some i   less second problem. After all the higher is the equilibrium
payo¤ euj, the easier it is to get country j to emit a high amount this period (in order
to punish i). From the result for second-best problems it then follows that from the
second period onwards, the emission must be at some constant level a(x i). The
theorem is proved.
9.5. Greenhouse Trap. Proof of Theorem 8: Suppose that the initial GHG
level g0 is above the Pareto optimal steady state bg. In that case, country i faces a
best response problem that is identical to the one it would face if the rest of the world
emitted a at all levels of GHG. Note that even if i drops her emission to zero, the
GHG level would still remain above bg; after all, g+(I 1)a  g+Iba > bg. (Recall
Condition L - (I   1)a  Iba - and that bg + Iba = bg. It follows therefore that, if
g > bg, the best response for i is to play the BAU level a.
Suppose instead that g  bg. There are two possibilities for i0s emission - either
the emission level is chosen to be so high that the next periods GHG stock is abovebg or it is not. Consider the two cases separately.
Case 1 Emissions such that gt+1 > bg, i.e., ai > a(gt).
In this case, the lifetime payo¤s are h(ai)   cgt + [u   wgt+1], where u is the
BAU payo¤, u = h(a
) wIa
1  . Substituting for the relevant expressions, the optimal
deviation in this case is then determined by
Maxai>a(g) h(ai)  cg + [
h(a)  wIa
1     w(g + (I   1)a(g) + ai)]
Collecting only the terms that involve ai the above expression immediately sim-
plies to
Maxai>a(g) h(ai)  wai
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and its solution is, in fact, the BAU emission level a.22 Hence, the best deviation
payo¤ in this case reduces to
u   wg + w(I   1)(a   a(g))
Case 2 Emissions such that gt+1  bg, i.e., ai  a(gt).
It will be more convenient to think of emission levels in this case as a(g) ,  > 0.
Since we only need to consider one-shot deviations, and because lowering emissions
unilaterally will simply delay by one period the convergence to the steady state bg, it
follows that the optimal deviation can be derived from the following exercise
Max0 h(a(g)  ) + [h(ba+ 
I
) + c]
where we have used the following facts: i) an  cut-back by country i leaves the
state of the system at bg    in the next period and ii) that requires an additional 
I
emission by each country to bring the GHG level two periods hence up to the Pareto
optimal steady state of bg. It is straightforward to verify that the maximand above is
concave. A su¢ cient condition for the maximizer to be  = 0 (which is what we want
to show) is that the derivative at that point be non-positive, i.e.,

I
h0(ba)  h0(a(g))  c
By the second part of Condition L, a  a(g), and hence by the concavity of h, a
su¢ cient condition for the last inequality is

I
h0(ba)  h0(a)  c
Note that h0(ba) = Ic
1  and that h
0(a) = c
1  . After making the appropriate
substitutions, it is easy to see that the two sides of the inequality are actually equal
to each other (and to c 
1  ). Hence, the optimal deviation is not to deviate.
Combining the two cases we have the following: a(g) is a best response (to a(g))
provided it yields higher lifetime payo¤s than a. Note that the lifetime payo¤s to
a(g) are
h(a(g)  wg   wIa(g) + bu
Elementary algebra says that the lifetime payo¤s to a(g) are higher if and only if
h(a(g)  wIa(g) + bu  h(a)  wIa + u + w(I   1)(a   a(g))
22Another way of saying what we just did is that if country i is going to push the game into the
BAU region, then she might as well take the unilaterally optimal action a to do so.
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Since h(a)   wIa is a concave function that is maximized at ba and since a(g) 2
[ba; a], it follows that h(a(g)  wIa(g)  h(a)  wIa. Hence a su¢ cient condition
for the last inequality to hold is that
bu  u + w(I   1)(a   a(g))
In turn the second term in the right-hand side is strictly smaller than wI(a ba)
and so a su¢ cient condition for the inequality is
bu  u + wI(a   ba)
From the denitions, it follows that the condition is equivalent to
h(ba)  wIba  h(a)  wIa + (1  )wI(a   ba)
As  " 1, the inequality converges to
h(ba)  w(1)Iba  h(a)  w(1)Ia
where the present undiscounted costs w(1) = c
1  and ba and a are respectively
the solutions toMax h(a)  Iw(1)a andMax h(a)  w(1)a (and hence ba 6= a): By
denition, the last inequality is actually a strict inequality. It follows therefore that
the su¢ cient condition for a(g) to be a (strictly) better response that a holds for all
 appropriately close to 1. The theorem is proved.
Proof of Theorem 9: The proof may be found in Dutta and Radner (2004d).

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